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Researchers in Switzerland claim to have built a perfect random number generator from two quantum superconducting chips, a 30-meter-long pipe, and some software. The resulting device could be used to generate cryptographic keys, or to offer a “public randomness service” for lotteries or blockchain applications, they say.

They’re not the first to make the claim.

Many sources of randomness are biased. For example, coins or dice tend to favor one side. “Even modern random number generators, which are based on quantum mechanical effects like the reflection of photons from beam splitters, are not entirely immune to such a systematic error or ‘bias’,” said Andreas Wallraff, one of the leaders of the research team at ETH Zurich.

Similar biases can be found in purely software-based pseudo-random number generators. This has led to security problems in IoT devices and WhatsApp, among other applications.

To get around that, the researchers set up of two supercomputing chips, each representing one qubit, cooled to near absolute zero. The chips are connected by a 30-meter-long microwave guide, similarly cooled, and the microwave photons flying between them create a situation of quantum entanglement.

The results produced by this process are then transformed via a special algorithm to generate perfect randomness. “The resulting sequence of zeros and ones is now really perfectly random, and we can even certify that,” said Renato Renner, the other team leader. “The technical improvements allowed us to create random numbers that will remain perfectly random for all eternity.”

The team published their results this week in an article entitled “Experimental randomness amplification” in Nature.

This article first appeared on CSO.

DDoS attacks are increasingly being sold like subscription services, complete with pricing tiers, support, and reseller programs. Flare explores how the DDoS-as-a-Service market has evolved from scattered tools into polished attack platforms. [...]

Dutch authorities have taken offline a massive botnet of 17 million devices and seized more than 200 servers at a local provider that supported the operation. [...]

Google says the Chrome Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) security feature is now generally available and is rolling out to all users to prevent account takeovers. [...]

A previously undocumented threat actor dubbed GREYVIBE has been attributed to ongoing and persistent attacks targeting Ukraine and Ukraine-related entities since at least August 2025. GREYVIBE, per WithSecure, is assessed to be a Russian-speaking group operating broadly in the Russian time zone, with the activities aligning with Kremlin state interests, specifically when it comes to Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

A North Carolina man was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison for selling the personal information of over 7 million elderly Americans to Jamaican scammers. [...]

Shadow AI used to mean employees pasting things they shouldn't into ChatGPT. It now means something bigger: employees building full applications with AI, wiring them into production systems, and publishing them on the open internet. Without Security or IT in the loop. The artifact moved from a prompt to a product. The risk surface moved with it. In The Shadow Builders report (get it here), a [email protected]

A Google security engineer was charged with insider trading after winning $1.2 million using confidential company data to place bets on the cryptocurrency-based Polymarket decentralized prediction market. [...]

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a malicious NuGet package that masquerades as a C# software development kit for Sicoob, one of Brazil's largest cooperative financial systems, to siphon client IDs and PFX certificates. According to Socket, versions 2.0.0 through 2.0.4 of "Sicoob.Sdk" contain functionality to exfiltrate sensitive information, including PFX certificates that are used to Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

The ShinyHunters extortion gang stole personal information from 4.9 million accounts after hacking the U.S. telecom giant Charter Communications in early April, according to data breach notification service Have I Been Pwned. [...]

Introduction

Containerization using Docker has become firmly established in modern development standards, significantly increasing the speed and convenience of deploying various services. Developers often use ready-made Docker images, making only minimal changes. The largest repository of container images is the Docker Hub service.

Container-hosted infrastructure is an attractive target for attackers. At a minimum, a compromised container can be used for DDoS attacks, cryptocurrency mining, or traffic proxying. The list of threats does not end there: once an attacker gains control of a container, they can steal or destroy data directly from it, access neighboring containers, or even attempt to escape the container, compromising the entire enterprise network.

At the same time, the infrastructure inside containers is typically updated less frequently and may contain outdated and vulnerable software versions. When deploying third-party images or modifying them for a specific environment, it is easy to make configuration errors that attackers can later exploit. And due to the architectural characteristics of containers, developers often face constraints when preparing images; to overcome these, they may resort to insecure solutions they find online.

In other words, containerized infrastructure can be both the simplest and the most lucrative target to exploit. Therefore, its security requires heightened attention. To minimize the risk of successful attacks on container infrastructure, it is essential to check the final Docker images, including all underlying layers, for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. The easiest way to do this is by analyzing the Dockerfile; however, it is not always available for inspection. Moreover, it typically defines how to build layers on top of a base image from an external repository whose reliability cannot be guaranteed.

Image analysis results in Kaspersky Container Security

To help users identify insecure configurations and potential vulnerabilities within them, we have added our AI assistant to Kaspersky Container Security.KIRA (the assistant’s name) uses artificial intelligence to analyze the image and identify potential issues within, along with recommendations on how to fix them.

As part of this study, we asked KIRA to analyze a number of popular community images, and later in this article, we’ll show you the results.

Software vulnerabilities and compromise of update sources

One of the key security issues with using pre-built images is that developers do not update them in a timely manner. A Docker image is, by its very nature, a snapshot of a specific Linux distribution after packages have been installed on it. However, in most cases, it does not receive security updates on its own, unlike traditional Linux servers, where these updates are automatically installed by specialized services, such as unattended-upgrades in Debian-based distributions and dnf-automatic in RedHat-based distributions.

To apply updates to a Docker image, it must be rebuilt and redeployed. Often, this process is not automated, and some updates require additional effort to verify their correct operation, modify configurations when upgrading to new software versions, and so on. As a result, many popular images do not receive timely updates, which significantly increases the risks associated with their use.

An image that was secure at build time accumulates vulnerabilities as they are discovered in the packages installed within it, which over time significantly increases the opportunities for a successful attack on the container.

Vulnerable versions of web applications and network services accessible from the internet immediately become targets of various malicious campaigns. For example, just one day after the discovery of the CVE-2025-55182 vulnerability in React Server Components, our honeypots recorded numerous attack attempts related to this vulnerability. It was adopted by operators of many malicious campaigns, ranging from classic cryptocurrency miners to variants of Mirai and Gafgyt. Attackers are constantly adding new distribution methods and can use dozens of exploits targeting various vulnerabilities and configuration errors in popular services. Often, the same vulnerabilities are used in self-propagation mechanisms from already compromised hosts. For example, in a malicious campaign to spread the Dero miner, attackers use infected containers to automatically search for and infect new targets.

In addition to vulnerabilities that can be exploited remotely, attackers are rapidly adding local vulnerabilities to their arsenal, used to gain root privileges and escape the container: in the Kinsing malware campaign, attackers used CVE-2023-4911 (Looney Tunables) to elevate privileges, and in the perfctl campaign, the CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) vulnerability was used for the same purpose. The access gained was used to install a rootkit that hides the presence of perfctl on the system.

To assess the situation with unpatched vulnerabilities in containers, we took a random sample of 100 images, which included various popular solutions with 10,000 to 1 million downloads on DockerHub. In the 64 images we scanned, we found outdated software versions with critical vulnerabilities. For example, some images contained the CVE-2025-49844 vulnerability in the Redis server, leading to RCE by leveraging a vulnerability in the Lua parser; the current CVE-2026-24061 vulnerability in nginx, which in some configurations leads to a server process crash, and with ASLR disabled, again, to RCE; vulnerabilities CVE-2025-32463 in sudo and CVE-2023-4911 in glibc, allowing an attacker to gain root privileges with local access. At the same time, only one in ten Docker images from the analyzed sample is fully up to date.

TOP 10 Critical Vulnerabilities with PoC/Exploits available as shown in the Kaspersky Container Security Dashboard

It is worth noting that, of course, not every discovered vulnerability can be directly exploited by attackers. A practical risk arises when the vulnerable application or library is actually in use, and the conditions necessary for exploitation – which vary significantly from vulnerability to vulnerability – are met. Nevertheless, updates must not be ignored, as the risk of vulnerabilities being exploited – both individually and in various combinations – cannot be predicted in each specific case, and even vulnerabilities that seem harmless at first glance can ultimately pose a serious risk of compromise.

A record number of vulnerabilities in a single image

However, frequent updates have a downside. Every rebuild that downloads new packages from source repositories introduces an additional risk of a supply chain attack – a compromised dependency or a modified base image could silently inject malicious code into your environment precisely through an update. During our analysis of images from the sample, we did not find any signs of supply chain attacks. However, in March 2026, a supply chain incident occurred in the Trivy and LiteLLM projects. In the case of Trivy, the infected file was injected directly into the container image in the official repositories.

Detecting potentially malicious software using one of the images as an example

This leads to a difficult choice: infrequent updates leave known vulnerabilities unpatched within the image, while frequent updates increase the risk of supply chain compromise. Therefore, to protect your infrastructure, you need not only to regularly update base images but also to take a more comprehensive approach, specifically by pinning dependencies to known-good versions and scanning the resulting images for malware upon update.

Configuration vulnerabilities

Even a container with a fully updated image can be compromised if it is configured incorrectly. Embedding keys and secrets in the image, disabling authentication in network services, default passwords, and insecure file access permissions – all of these can be exploited by attackers in one way or another to achieve their goals.

Insecure image configurations detected by KCS based on rules

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that errors may be introduced by the authors of the original image, which complicates their detection, as this requires analyzing every layer and the command that generated it. As with vulnerabilities, not every configuration error leads to compromise: it all depends on the container’s role, its network accessibility, and many other factors. But the very use of insecure settings will sooner or later lead to errors appearing in images where their consequences will be significantly more dangerous.

Standard rules are often insufficient for analyzing problematic configurations. To gain a deeper understanding of the context and assess potential risks, AI tools can be used. Later in this section, we will examine examples of typical insecure configurations we discovered while scanning public images from Docker Hub, along with the descriptions of issues and risk mitigation methods provided by the KIRA AI assistant.

Example of container analysis using KIRA

Insecure handling of credentials Use of default passwords

In some cases, containers may use default passwords set via environment variables or directly in Dockerfile. If these passwords are not overridden, attackers will be able to access the application by using the default password.

RUN |1 DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive /bin/sh -c echo [removed]:[removed] | chpasswd

According to KIRA’s analysis, the user’s password is stored in plain text in the image layer history. Anyone who gains access to the image – whether through a public registry, a compromised build environment, or other means – will be able to extract the password. If SSH or another form of interactive access is enabled in the container, this could lead to its complete compromise and allow attackers to move laterally within the infrastructure.

Passwords may be present in environment variables. Consider the following Dockerfile snippet:

ENV SERVERNAME=localhost WWW_PATH_CONF=/etc/apache2/apache2.conf WWW_PATH_ROOT=/var/www HTTPS=on PKP_CLI_INSTALL=0 PKP_DB_HOST=db PKP_DB_NAME=pkp PKP_DB_USER=pkp PKP_DB_PASSWORD=changeMePlease PKP_WEB_CONF=/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/pkp.conf PKP_CONF=config.inc.php PKP_CMD=/usr/local/bin/pkp-start

In this example, the environment variable PKP_DB_PASSWORD is set to changeMePlease. If the user forgets to override it, the application will use the password that can be obtained from Dockerfile.

Let’s look at another image:

/bin/sh -c #(nop)  ENV MOODLE_URL=<a href="http://0.0.0.0/">http://0.0.0.0</a> MOODLE_ADMIN admin       MOODLE_ADMIN_PASSWORD [removed]      MOODLE_ADMIN_EMAIL [email protected] MOODLE_DB_HOST     MOODLE_DB_PASSWORD       MOODLE_DB_USER     MOODLE_DB_NAME    MOODLE_DB_PORT 3306

For this image, Dockerfile specifies that the administrator password is hardcoded in the ENV directive and remains in the image metadata (layer history, docker inspect). Anyone who gains access to the image (registry, build cache) will be able to extract this secret and compromise the account.

To eliminate these risks, ensure that no passwords are specified in Dockerfile. If authentication is required, you can use orchestrator mechanisms (secrets) or generate a temporary password when starting the container via the entrypoint script, without saving it in the layers. We also recommend using mechanisms for securely passing secrets at runtime (Docker secrets, Kubernetes Secrets) or, as a last resort, passing them via --secret during the build with BuildKit, but under no circumstances should they be left in the final image.

Passing passwords via command arguments

In some cases, passwords may be exposed when passed via command-line arguments, as these arguments are visible to all users on the system:

/bin/sh -c #(nop)  HEALTHCHECK &amp;{[""CMD-SHELL"" ""mysql --protocol TCP -u\""root\"" -p\""$MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD\"" -e \""SELECT 1;\""""] ""15s"" ""30s"" ""0s"" '\x05'}

In the example provided, the MySQL superuser password is passed into the healthcheck command in plaintext, making it visible when viewing the process list (ps aux), in audit logs, and in monitoring systems. If the attacker gains read access to the container’s processes or logs, they can extract the password and gain full control of the database.

To fix this issue, the healthcheck should use a local connection via a Unix socket with default authentication (if the auth_socket plugin is configured for root), or create a dedicated user with minimal privileges (e.g., only USAGE), without a password or with a password passed via a secure file (--defaults-file with restricted permissions). You can also use the MYSQL_PWD environment variable for healthcheck authentication, but it remains visible in /proc.

Privilege escalation in the container

One of the most common vectors for initial compromise of Linux systems is RCE in web applications and network services. Typically, these services have minimal privileges, which complicates attackers’ subsequent actions: dumping credentials, covering their tracks, attempting to escape the container, and much more.

The situation worsens significantly if the attacker gains root privileges, as this allows them to fully control all processes within the container, conceal their activity, and use methods to escape the container. For example, they can compromise the host if the container is privileged, a Docker socket is mounted inside it, or other insecure configurations and vulnerabilities exist that cannot be exploited with standard user privileges.

Similarly, this simplifies network attacks on neighboring containers, the orchestrator, and various internal services, making this configuration error a potential link in the chain for compromising the entire network.

Attacks on sudo

One of the simplest privilege escalation methods is executing arbitrary commands as root using sudo without entering a password. Consider the following example:

/bin/sh -c set -xe;     apt-get update &amp;&amp;       apt-get -y install sudo;       echo ""solr ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL"" &gt;/etc/sudoers.d/solr;

Analyzing this configuration using KIRA immediately highlights the main issue: by installing the sudo package and setting NOPASSWD: ALL for the solr, the user severely violates the principle of least privilege. The Solr platform does not require such broad privileges to run within a container; instead, they create an easy path for escalating to root.

echo 'postgres ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' &gt;&gt; /etc/sudoers

In another example of an insecure configuration, NOPASSWD:ALL privileges are granted to a PostgreSQL database user, which is a direct and severe weakening of the access control policy. If an attacker gains the ability to execute code on behalf of the postgres user – through a vulnerability in a network service, an SQL injection, or by compromising of one of the processes – they will immediately and unconditionally be able to execute any commands on behalf of the root user. This is equivalent to the entire container running as root.

As a risk mitigation measure, we recommend completely removing this directive. The minimum necessary commands requiring privileges should be delegated on a case-by-case basis via sudoers with explicit specification of allowed executables and parameters, using NOPASSWD only as a last resort and for specific utilities.

Our AI assistant KIRA can identify even more complex insecure configurations, such as allowing passwordless sudo for the entire sudo group — by modifying existing rules.

perl -i -pe 's/\bALL$/NOPASSWD:ALL/g' /etc/sudoers

The risk in this example is that the command replaces standard declarations requiring authentication with passwordless execution of all commands for any user within the sudo group – potentially including postgres, should it be assigned to that group. This expands the attack surface to all group members, turning each of them into a potential point for instant privilege escalation.

To mitigate the risks, we recommend not modifying the global sudoers policy, keeping the standard password requirement, or using a more secure escalation mechanism – such as gosu to run a specific process on behalf of another user without permanent privileges.

Insecure file permissions

Another common vector for privilege escalation is insecurely configured file and directory permissions. Most often, for convenience, container image authors use 777 permissions, which allow anyone – including unprivileged users – to freely create and delete files, as well as modify their contents. This can lead to both privilege escalation and the ability for an unprivileged attacker to delete or modify logs, among other undesirable consequences.

Consider the following command:

chmod 0777 /usr/share/cargo /usr/share/cargo/bin

The risk is that directories containing binary files and scripts will become writable by any container user. This allows a low-privileged attacker to replace utilities included in cargo or add new malicious executables. When these tools are subsequently invoked, especially as the root user or via sudo, the attacker’s code will execute with the inherited privileges of the calling process, leading directly to a local privilege escalation.

To mitigate the risks, you can set the minimum necessary permissions: chmod 0755 for directories and chmod 0755/0644 for the corresponding files. The owner should be root, and only the owner should be allowed to write. Do not use chmod 777 on any system paths.

Lack of integrity checks

Downloading software without verifying its integrity can make the infrastructure vulnerable to software tampering.

For example, this risk may arise when downloading a distribution via HTTP:

RUN /bin/sh -c wget -qO- ""<a href="http://acestream.org/downloads/linux/acestream_3.1.49_debian_9.9_x86_64.tar.gz">http://acestream.org/downloads/linux/acestream_3.1.49_debian_9.9_x86_64.tar.gz</a>"" | tar --extract --gzip -C /opt/acestream

Using HTTP without verifying the archive’s integrity creates conditions for a man-in-the-middle attack during the image build phase. An attacker controlling the communication channel or DNS can replace the archive with malicious content, which will compromise the container and the entire environment in which it runs.

To mitigate the risks, you can configure connections to web resources to use HTTPS only — if the resource supports this protocol. You can also download the archive without extracting it, compare its checksum (SHA256) with the checksum from a trusted source, and only then extract it. It is advisable to store the verified archive in an internal artifact repository to avoid direct downloads from the network.

There will still be a MitM risk even if certificate verification is disabled:

wget --no-check-certificate<a href="https://github.com/phpvirtualbox/phpvirtualbox/archive/refs/heads/7.2-dev.zip"> https://github.com/phpvirtualbox/phpvirtualbox/archive/refs/heads/7.2-dev.zip</a> -O phpvirtualbox.zip

The absence of TLS certificate verification allows an attacker controlling the network segment to replace the downloaded ZIP archive with malicious content. Since the archive contains PHP code that will be executed by the web server, compromise during the build phase will result in the deployment of a backdoor or data leakage.

To mitigate the risks, remove the --no-check-certificate flag; after downloading, calculate the SHA256 hash of the archive and verify it against a known reference value (the release page or a local repository of trusted hashes). Additionally, consider using a fixed release (tag) rather than the floating 7.2-dev branch.

Conclusion

Docker containers have become a very popular means of deploying software, and attackers are by no means oblivious to this trend. They are rapidly adding software vulnerabilities and configuration errors to their arsenal and carrying out attacks on supply chains. They can compromise container infrastructure for a wide variety of purposes, from cryptocurrency mining to encrypting data for ransom or stealing information critical to the company.

Our research found that 64 out of 100 container images for popular applications contain critically vulnerable software, and only 10% are fully up to date. We also identified numerous insecure configurations, including passwords stored in plaintext in Dockerfiles and excessive privileges granted to users and processes.

To detect and prevent these threats, it is essential to strictly adhere to security measures: audit image configurations, securely manage secrets used in images, apply security updates in a timely manner, scan their contents for malware with every update, and follow industry-standard best practices for enhancing security.

This approach requires specialized solutions built to accommodate the unique characteristics of container environments. Kaspersky Container Security ensures the security of containerized applications at every stage of their lifecycle, from development to operation. The product protects an organization’s business processes, helps ensure compliance with industry standards and security regulations, and enables the implementation of secure software development practices.

It’s hard for people to tell the difference between AI-generated advertising and writing. So why do they respond better to the human-made stuff?

AI vs. Mad Men

Ipsos, along with faculty members from Syracuse University’s S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, just published a unique advertising study. They took 20 real ads from major brands, including Cheerios, Chewy, Febreze, Fiat, H&M, Old Navy, Herbal Essences, Ray-Ban Meta, TurboTax and Visa. They fed the same creative briefs used by the human ad creatives into Google Gemini, then used OpenAI’s Sora to generate fully AI-produced counterparts with no human intervention. 

They showed the ads to 3,000 consumers. Only 25% of AI ad viewers were at least somewhat confident the spot was AI-made, and 40% of all viewers were uncertain either way — suggesting the public isn’t great at spotting ads that are AI generated. 

But here’s the interesting part: While most people didn’t register that ads were AI-generated, they also didn’t respond to them like they did with human-generated ads. They consistently rated human-made work as more eye-catching and more imaginative. 

In other words, people assumed AI ads were made by people, but didn’t particularly like them compared to human-generated ads. And that means human-generated ads performed much better. 

Ads made by people without AI were 14% stronger on short-term sales impact and 17% stronger on long-term brand health.

To me, the data here suggests that while people can’t easily discern the difference between AI- and human-generated content, the AI stuff hits wrong on a subconscious level. And I think that’s happening with AI social posts, AI blog posts and AI slop in general. 

In fact, I’ve noticed it strongly in my own response to AI-generated content. It often looks perfect but bothers me for reasons that aren’t immediately obvious. 

The researchers explained AI’s inability to match human ad creativity by pointing out that AI draws from what already exists, while great advertising breaks new ground. AI can replicate the conventions of advertising, but it can’t transcend them, make a creative leap or engender emotion like people can. 

A broad range of research beyond the Ipsos study suggests that skillful people working with AI tools will always outperform AI alone, and often outperform people not using AI tools. Ipsos’ advice? Ad agencies should keep people at the center of brand storytelling and emotive assets. 

Can AI write right?

Another recent study looked at written web content and compared how human-written articles “performed” on search engines compared to AI-generated content. Semrush analyzed 42,000 blog pages across 20,000 keywords, ran every single one through GPTZero’s AI detector, and cross-referenced the results with actual Google Search results. It also surveyed 224 search-engine optimization (SEO) professionals about their AI habits and beliefs.

They found a disconcerting disconnect between what SEO people believe and what is actually true. Some 72% of SEO professionals who use AI content say it performs just as well or better than human-written content in search rankings. But it turns out that human-generated posts strongly outperform AI-generated. 

Content classified as purely AI-generated appeared in the top spot in search result just 9% of the time. Content classified as human-written was there 80% of the time.” That’s a roughly 8-to-1 advantage. (Note that the coveted top link in search results typically gets around one-third of the clicks.)

For lower page-one positions — from the fifth position down (which get relatively few clicks) — AI- and human-generated posts perform more similarly. (The researchers also found that when people write posts with a little help from AI, their posts rank better much than AI-only content.)

Those Semrush results are consistent with previous research. 

• NP Digital conducted an oft-cited study two years ago that found that human-written content ranked higher 94.12% of the time on Google than AI content. 
• A Graphite/Common Crawl analysis found that 86% of articles ranking high on Google Search are human-written (only 14% AI-generated), and ChatGPT and Perplexity cite human-written articles 82% of the time (only 18% AI). 
• On LinkedIn, more than half of site’s long-form content in 2025 was classified as “Likely AI” by Originality.ai. Engagement on verified human content was 61% higher than the AI-marked posts. 

Note that engagement performance varied by industry; that 61% result is an aggregate average across all industries. Ironically, in the category of “Leadership & Inspiration,” AI posts outperformed human posts by 75%. 

The absurd lesson here: If you want to be a thought leader on LinkedIn, don’t lead with your own thoughts. 

Quantity vs. quality

What all this research boils down to is that human-generated content (with or without help from AI) attracts far more traffic and higher engagement than AI-generated content. AI content is essentially invisible in high-value channels and while it might be high in quantity, it’s low in quality where it really matters — with reach and influence. 

As with the ad creative study by Ipsos, the conclusion of all this research is the same: People (and search engines) respond much better to creative content produced by people compared with AI-generated content. 

In short, AI is great at “flooding the zone” at high speed and low cost — and there’s a ton of AI-generated content out there. A quick check reveals that: 

• More than half of all written content on websites is now AI-written.
• Almost half of all music uploaded is now AI-generated.
• Nearly one-quarter of all videos uploaded are AI-generated or manipulated.
• Around 40% of all podcast episode uploads are AI-generated.
• More than 70% of all images uploaded to social media may be AI-generated or manipulated.
• And wll over half of all social posts are AI-generated

The specific numbers are my best estimates, and they’re changing fast each month. The takeaway is that AI-generated content is exploding in volume. 

But it isn’t reaching people the way human-generated content does. Take podcasts, for example. While roughly 40% of new podcast episode uploads are AI-generated, that 40% captures less than 1% of the listening hours. Of the top 100 podcasts, zero are AI-generated.

A clear picture is emerging about the use of AI for content generation. AI is great for churning out a lot of content at low cost. It can be good for some kinds of content — if a skillful person directs it. And AI can be a helpful tool for content creators. 

But when it comes to direct comparisons between people and AI, it’s clear that the winning content — the stuff with the best “performance” on search, best reception by people and the most engaging — is always human-generated. 

CryptoLocker. WannaCry. DarkSide. Conti. MedusaLocker. Qilin. The ransomware threat has exploded over the past decade, and it isn’t going away anytime soon; the news brings constant reports of new waves of this pernicious type of malware washing across the world.

Ransomware gained in popularity in large part because of the immediate financial payoff for attackers: It works by encrypting the files on your hard disk, then demanding that you pay a ransom, frequently in Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency, to decrypt them. Now many ransomware gangs are switching tactics, stealthily infiltrating enterprise systems, collecting sensitive corporate data over time, and later threatening to expose that data if the organization doesn’t pay up.

Nevertheless, individuals and businesses are still at risk from traditional ransomware attacks. In this article, I’ll show you how to keep yourself safe in Windows 11 — and Windows 10 too, for those who haven’t yet moved to Windows 11 — including how to use an anti-ransomware tool built into both versions of Windows.

(Administrators, see “What IT needs to know about ransomware and Windows” at the end of this article.)

This article assumes that you’re already taking the basic precautions against malware in general, including running anti-malware software and never downloading attachments or clicking links in email from unknown senders and suspicious-looking email. Also note that this article has been updated for Windows 11 25H2 and Windows 10 22H2. If you have an earlier Windows release, some things may be different.

Use controlled folder access

Microsoft is concerned enough about ransomware that it built an easy-to-configure anti-ransomware tool directly into Windows 10 and 11. Called controlled folder access, it protects you by letting only safe and fully vetted applications access your files. Unknown applications or known malware threats aren’t allowed through.

By default, the feature is not turned on, so if you want to protect yourself against ransomware, you’ll have to tell it to get to work. And you can customize exactly how it works by adding new applications to its whitelist of programs that can access files, and adding new folders in addition to the ones that it protects by default.

To switch it on, you’ll need to access Windows Security. To get to it in Windows 11, click Start > Settings to open the Settings app, then select Privacy & Security > Windows Security.  

In Windows 10, click Start > Settings to open the Settings app, then select Update & Security > Windows Security.

In Windows Security, select Virus & threat protection. On the screen that appears, scroll down to the “Ransomware protection” section and click Manage ransomware protection. On the next screen, under “Controlled folder access,” toggle the switch to On. You’ll get a prompt asking if you want to make the change. Click Yes.

Switch the toggle to On to turn on controlled folder access.

Preston Gralla / Foundry

You shouldn’t leave it at that and feel safe yet, because there’s a chance that you have folders you’d like to protect that the feature ignores. By default, it protects Windows system folders (and folders underneath them) like C:\Users\UserName\Documents, where UserName is your Windows user name. In addition to Documents, Windows system folders include Desktop, Music, Pictures, and Videos.

But all your other folders are fair game for any ransomware that makes its way onto your PC.

To add folders you want protected, click the Protected folders link that appears after you switch on controlled folder access. A prompt appears asking if you want to make the change. Click Yes. Click the Add a protected folder button that is on top of the list of protected folders that appears, then navigate from the screen that appears to the folder you want to protect and click Select Folder.

Click Add a protected folder to protect more of your folders with controlled folder access.

Preston Gralla / Foundry

Continue to add folders in this way. Remember that when you add a folder, all folders underneath it are protected as well.

If you decide at any point to remove a folder, get back to the “Protected folders” screen, click the folder you want to remove, and then click Remove. Note that you won’t be able to remove any of the Windows system folders that are protected when you turn the feature on. You can only remove the ones that you’ve added.

Microsoft determines which applications should be allowed access to protected folders, and unsurprisingly, among them are its own Microsoft Office apps. Microsoft hasn’t published a list of which apps are allowed, though, so consider taking action to let apps you trust access your files.

To do it, go back to the screen where you turned on controlled folder access and click Allow an app through Controlled folder access. A prompt appears asking if you want to make the change. Click Yes. From the screen that appears, click Add an allowed app, navigate to the executable file of the program you want to add, click Open, and then confirm you want to add the file. As with adding folders to the list of protected folders, you can remove the app by getting back to this screen, clicking the application you want to remove, then clicking Remove.

Hint: If you’re not sure where executable files are located for programs you want to add to the allow list, look for the folder name with the program’s name in the “WindowsProgram Files” or “WindowsProgram Files (x86)” folders, then look for an executable file in that folder.

Note: In Windows 11, OneDrive folders are automatically protected by controlled folder access when you turn it on. However, they may not necessarily be protected in Windows 10. In Windows 10, on the “Ransomware protection” page, you’ll be notified in the Ransomware data recovery section whether your OneDrive files are protected. If they’re not protected, click the Set up OneDrive button there.

Back up… but do it properly

The whole point of ransomware is to hold your files hostage until you pay to unlock them. So one of the best protections from ransomware is to back up your files. That way, there’s no need to pay the ransom, because you can easily restore your files from the backup.

It’s a good idea to not just back up to a local drive but additionally use a reputable cloud-based storage and backup service. If you back up to a drive attached to your PC, when your PC gets infected with ransomware, the backup drive will likely be encrypted along with any other disks inside or attached to your PC. Cloud backups are generally less vulnerable but not wholly immune to ransomware attacks.

Make sure that your backup service uses versioning — that is, it keeps not just the current version of each of your files, but previous ones as well. That way, if the most current version of your files gets infected, you can restore from previous versions. Most popular backup and storage services, including Microsoft OneDrive, Google Drive, Carbonite, Dropbox, and many others, use versioning. It’s a good idea to get familiar with the versioning feature of whichever service you use now, so you can easily restore files in a pinch.

Some services, including OneDrive and Google Drive, now offer ransomware detection. Users are notified of suspicious activity and can use the vendors’ tools to remove infected files and restore older versions.

Stay patched

Microsoft regularly releases Windows 10 and Windows 11 security patches, and they’re automatically applied via Windows Update. But if you hear about a ransomware outbreak, you shouldn’t wait for Windows Update to work — you should immediately get the update yourself so that you’re protected as soon as possible. And it’s not just Windows updates you want to get. You also want to make sure Windows Security, Microsoft’s built-in anti-malware tool, has the latest anti-malware definitions.

To do both in Windows 10, go to Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update and click the Check for updates button. In Windows 11, go to Settings > Windows Update and click the Check for updates button. (If updates are already waiting for you, you’ll see them listed instead of the Check for updates button.) If Windows finds updates, it installs them. If it requires a reboot, it will tell you.

Checking for Windows 11 updates.

Preston Gralla / Foundry

You need to worry not just about Windows staying patched, but other software as well. If you use an anti-malware program other than Windows Security, make sure it and its malware definitions are up to date.

And the other software on your PC should be kept up to date as well. So check how each piece of software gets updated and make sure to update each one regularly. For help keeping all your apps up to date, consider setting up an automated tool like Patch My PC Updater or Software Update Monitor (see our tutorial “How to keep your apps up to date in Windows 10 and 11”) — or, if you’re comfortable using the command line, try the WinGet command (see “WinGet: The best way to keep Windows apps updated”).

Disable macros in Microsoft Office

Ransomware can be spread via macros in Office files, so to be safe you should turn them off. Microsoft now disables macros from the internet by default, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re turned off in your version of Office, depending on when you installed it and whether you’ve updated it.

To turn them off, when you’re in an Office application, select File > Options > Trust Center > Trust Center Settings and select either Disable all macros with notification or Disable all macros without notification. If you disable them with notification, when you open the file you’ll get a message warning that the macros were disabled and letting you turn them on. Only turn them on if you’re absolutely sure they’re from a safe, trusted source.

Here’s how to disable macros in Office.

Preston Gralla / Foundry

Get ransomware protection and/or mitigation tools

Just about any anti-malware program includes built-in anti-ransomware protections, but there are several programs that promise to specifically target ransomware. Most are paid, but there are also some free options.

Bitdefender offers free decryption tools that can unlock your data if you’ve been attacked by ransomware and it’s being held ransom. They can only decrypt data that’s been encrypted with certain specific pieces or families of ransomware, including REvil/Sodinokibi, DarkSide, MaMoCrypt, WannaRen, and several others. Avast offers its own set of free decryption tools.

What IT needs to know about ransomware and Windows

Many Microsoft 365 and Windows commercial plans, especially at the enterprise level, include ransomware detection and protection tools. Advanced products such as Microsoft Defender XDR are also available under separate licenses.

Even without those tools, there’s plenty that admins can do to protect Windows systems from ransomware. The most obvious: Apply the latest security patches to not just all PCs in an organization, but all servers and any other enterprise-level hardware. Also lock down application permissions, train users to spot phishing attempts, and, of course, securely back up all corporate data.

IT also needs to make sure the notoriously insecure SMB1 Windows networking protocol is disabled in all devices. Multiple ransomware attacks have spread through the 30-year-old protocol; even Microsoft says it should be used by no one, ever.

The good news is that Windows 10 version 1709, released in October 2017, finally did away with SMB1. (It’s not in Windows 11, either.) But that’s only for PCs with clean installs of version 1709 or later. Older PCs that were updated from earlier versions of Windows still have the protocol built in.

The Microsoft support article “Detect, enable and disable SMBv1, SMBv2, and SMBv3 in Windows” offers details about how to turn off the protocol. It recommends killing SMB1 but keeping SMB2 and SMB3 active, and only deactivating them for temporary troubleshooting.

Administrators can use the controlled folder access feature (covered earlier in this article) to stop ransomware from encrypting files and folders of PCs running Windows 11 or Windows 10 version 1709 or later. They can use the Group Policy Management Console, the Windows Security Center, or PowerShell to turn on controlled folder access for users on a network, customize which folders should be protected, and let additional applications access the folders beyond the Microsoft defaults, as detailed  in the Microsoft articles “Enable controlled folder access” and “Customize controlled folder access.”

One potential issue with controlled folder access is that it might block apps that users typically use from accessing folders. So Microsoft recommends using audit mode first, to see what will happen when controlled folder access is turned on. For information about how to do it, go to Microsoft’s “Evaluate exploit protection” documentation.

As noted above, Office macros can spread ransomware. Microsoft is now blocking macros downloaded from the internet by default, but to be safe, IT should use Group Policy to block them. For advice on how to do it, go to the “Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet” section on Microsoft’s “Macros from the internet will be blocked by default in Office” documentation.

This article was originally published in January 2018 and most recently updated in May 2026.

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