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Google Play Sign-Ins Allow Covert Location-Tracking

Threatpost - 2 Září, 2021 - 18:03
A design flaw involving Google Timeline could allow someone to track another device without installing a stalkerware app.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

What is AS-REP Roasting attack, really?

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 17:48
Microsoft's Active Directory is said to be used by 95% of Fortune 500. As a result, it is a prime target for attackers as they look to gain access to credentials in the organization, as compromised credentials provide one of the easiest ways for hackers to access your data. A key authentication technology that underpins Microsoft Active Directory is Kerberos. Unfortunately, hackers use many
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Cisco Patches Critical Authentication Bug With Public Exploit

Threatpost - 2 Září, 2021 - 17:41
There's proof-of-concept code out for the near-maximum critical – rated at 9.8 – authentication bypass bug, but Cisco hasn't seen any malicious exploit yet.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

7 Ways to Defend Mobile Apps, APIs from Cyberattacks

Threatpost - 2 Září, 2021 - 14:51
David Stewart, CEO, Approov, discusses the top mobile attack routes the bad guys use and the best defenses organizations can deploy against them.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

WhatsApp Photo Filter Bug Allows Sensitive Info to Be Lifted

Threatpost - 2 Září, 2021 - 14:28
Users should be careful whose pics they view and should, of course, update their apps.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

CloudLinux offers CentOS 8 users a support lifeline>

LinuxSecurity.com - 2 Září, 2021 - 14:23
Red Hat won't support CentOS 8 past the end of the year - but CloudLinux will provide updates and support to CentOS 8 until the end of 2025, giving CentOS 8 users a critical lifeline.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Chinese Authorities Arrest Hackers Behind Mozi IoT Botnet Attacks

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:59
The operators of the Mozi IoT botnet have been taken into custody by Chinese law enforcement authorities, nearly two years after the malware emerged on the threat landscape in September 2019. News of the arrest, which originally happened in June, was disclosed by researchers from Netlab, the network research division of Chinese internet security company Qihoo 360, earlier this Monday, detailing
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Linphone SIP Stack Bug Could Let Attackers Remotely Crash Client Devices

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:58
Cybersecurity researchers on Tuesday disclosed details about a zero-click security vulnerability in the Linphone Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) stack that could be remotely exploited without any action from a victim to crash the SIP client and cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition. Tracked as CVE-2021-33056 (CVSS score: 7.5), the issue concerns a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Cybercriminals Abusing Internet-Sharing Services to Monetize Malware Campaigns

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:57
Threat actors are capitalizing on the growing popularity of proxyware platforms like Honeygain and Nanowire to monetize their own malware campaigns, once again illustrating how attackers are quick to repurpose and weaponize legitimate platforms to their advantage. "Malware is currently leveraging these platforms to monetize the internet bandwidth of victims, similar to how malicious
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

QNAP Working on Patches for OpenSSL Flaws Affecting its NAS Devices

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:56
Network-attached storage (NAS) appliance maker QNAP said it's currently investigating two recently patched security flaws in OpenSSL to determine their potential impact, adding it will release security updates should its products turn out to be vulnerable. Tracked as CVE-2021-3711 (CVSS score: 7.5) and CVE-2021-3712 (CVSS score: 4.4), the weaknesses concern a high-severity buffer overflow in SM2
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Attackers Can Remotely Disable Fortress Wi-Fi Home Security Alarms

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:55
New vulnerabilities have been discovered in Fortress S03 Wi-Fi Home Security System that could be potentially abused by a malicious party to gain unauthorized access with an aim to alter system behavior, including disarming the devices without the victim's knowledge. The two unpatched issues, tracked under the identifiers CVE-2021-39276 (CVSS score: 5.3) and CVE-2021-39277 (CVSS score: 5.7),
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Logitech má nový USB dongle Logi Bolt. Je rychlejší a lépe šifruje komunikaci s periferiemi

Zive.cz - bezpečnost - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:45
Logitech oznámil nové příslušenství zaměřené na podniky a firmy, kde je jedním z klíčových požadavků bezpečnost. Jednou z novinek je USB dongle označený jako Logi Bolt, který má nabídnout nižší latenci a výrazně vyšší úroveň zabezpečení komunikace s připojenými periferiemi. Na první pohled se ...
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Digital State IDs Start Rollouts Despite Privacy Concerns

Threatpost - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:28
Eight states are introducing drivers licenses and identification cards available for use on Apple iPhones and Watches, but critics warn about the dangers of eliminating the use of a paper-based system entirely.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Comcast RF Attack Leveraged Remotes for Surveillance

Threatpost - 2 Září, 2021 - 13:03
IoT vulnerabilities turned the remote into a listening device, researchers found, which impacted 18 million Xfinity customers.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

WhatsApp Photo Filter Bug Could Have Exposed Your Data to Remote Attackers

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 12:07
A now-patched high-severity security vulnerability in WhatApp's image filter feature could have been abused to send a malicious image over the messaging app to read sensitive information from the app's memory. Tracked as CVE-2020-1910 (CVSS score: 7.8), the flaw concerns an out-of-bounds read/write and stems from applying specific image filters to a rogue image and sending the altered image to
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

QakBot technical analysis

Kaspersky Securelist - 2 Září, 2021 - 12:00

Main description

QakBot, also known as QBot, QuackBot and Pinkslipbot, is a banking Trojan that has existed for over a decade. It was found in the wild in 2007 and since then it has been continually maintained and developed.

In recent years, QakBot has become one of the leading banking Trojans around the globe. Its main purpose is to steal banking credentials (e.g., logins, passwords, etc.), though it has also acquired functionality allowing it to spy on financial operations, spread itself, and install ransomware in order to maximize revenue from compromised organizations.

To this day, QakBot continues to grow in terms of functionality, with even more capabilities and new techniques such as logging keystrokes, a backdoor functionality, and techniques to evade detection. It’s worth mentioning that the latter includes virtual environment detection, regular self-updates and cryptor/packer changes. In addition, QakBot tries to protect itself from being analyzed and debugged by experts and automated tools.

Another interesting piece of functionality is the ability to steal emails. These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails.

QakBot infection chain

QakBot is known to infect its victims mainly via spam campaigns. In some cases, the emails were delivered with Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel) or password-protected archives with the documents attached. The documents contained macros and victims were prompted to open the attachments with claims that they contained important information (e.g., an invoice). In some cases, the emails contained links to web pages distributing malicious documents.

However, there is another infection vector that involves a malicious QakBot payload being transferred to the victim’s machine via other malware on the compromised machine.

The initial infection vectors may vary depending on what the threat actors believe has the best chance of success for the targeted organization(s). It’s known that various threat actors perform reconnaissance (OSINT) of target organizations beforehand to decide which infection vector is most suitable.

QakBot infection chain

The infection chain of recent QakBot releases (2020-2021 variants) is as follows:

  • The user receives a phishing email with a ZIP attachment containing an Office document with embedded macros, the document itself or a link to download malicious document.
  • The user opens the malicious attachment/link and is tricked into clicking “Enable content”.
  • A malicious macro is executed. Some variants perform a ‘GET’ request to a URL requesting a ‘PNG’ However, the file is in fact a binary.
  • The loaded payload (stager) includes another binary containing encrypted resource modules. One of the encrypted resources has the DLL binary (loader) which is decrypted later during runtime.
  • The ‘Stager’ loads the ‘Loader’ into the memory, which decrypts and runs the payload during runtime. The configuration settings are retrieved from another resource.
  • The payload communicates with the C2 server.
  • Additional threats such as ProLock ransomware can now be pushed to the infected machine.
Typical QakBot functions

Typical QakBot malicious activity observed in the wild includes:

  • Collecting information about the compromised host;
  • Creating scheduled tasks (privilege escalation and persistency);
  • Credentials harvesting:
    • Credential dumping (Mimikatz, exe access)*;
    • Password stealing (from browser data and cookies);
    • Targeting web banking links (web injects)*.
  • Password brute forcing;
  • Registry manipulation (persistence);
  • Creating a copy of itself;
  • Process injection to conceal the malicious process.
Communication with C2

The QakBot malware contains a list of 150 IP addresses hardcoded into the loader binary resource. Most of these addresses belong to other infected systems that are used as a proxy to forward traffic to other proxies or the real С2.

Communication with the С2 is a HTTPS POST request with Base64-encoded data. The data is encrypted with the RC4 algorithm. The static string “jHxastDcds)oMc=jvh7wdUhxcsdt2” and a random 16-byte sequence are used for encryption. The data itself is in JSON format.

Original message in JSON format

HTTPS POST request with encrypted JSON

Usually, after infection the bot sends a ‘PING’ message, ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message and ‘ASK for COMMAND’ message, and the C2 replies with ‘ACK’ and ‘COMMAND’ messages. If additional modules were pushed by the C2, the bot sends a ‘STOLEN INFO’ message containing data stolen by the modules.

  • ‘PING’ message – bot request message to C2 with ‘BOT ID’ in order to check if С2 is active:

‘PING’ message

  • ‘ACK’ message – C2 response message with field “16” containing the external IP address of the infected system, the only valuable information:

‘ACK’ message

  • ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message – bot request message to C2 with information collected about the infected system. In addition to general system information such as OS version and bitness, user name, computer name, domain, screen resolution, system time, system uptime and bot uptime, it also contains the results of the following utilities and WMI queries:
    • whoami /all
    • arp -a
    • ipconfig /all
    • net view /all
    • cmd /c set
    • nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=10 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.{DOMAIN}
    • nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
    • net share
    • route print
    • netstat -nao
    • net localgroup
    • qwinsta
    • WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_BIOS
    • WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_DiskDrive
    • WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PhysicalMemory
    • WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_Product
    • WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PnPEntity

‘SYSTEM INFO’ message

  • ‘ASK for COMMAND’ message – bot command request message to C2. After the ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message is sent, the bot starts asking the C2 for a command to execute. One of the main fields is “14” – the SALT. This field is unique and changes in every request. It is used to protect against hijacking or takeover of a bot. After receiving this request, the С2 uses the SALT in the signing procedure and places the signature in the response, so the bot can check the signed data. Only a valid and signed command will be executed.

‘ASK for COMMAND’ message

  • ‘COMMAND’ message – C2 response message with command to execute. The current version of the bot supports 24 commands, most of them related to download, execution, drop of additional modules and module configuration files with different options, or setup/update configuration values.
    This type of message contains the signed value of the SALT (obtained from the bot’s request field “14”), COMMAND ID and MODULE ID. The other values of the message are not signed.In previous versions, the bot received modules and commands immediately after infection and sending a ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message. Now, the C2 responds with an empty command for about an hour. Only after that will the C2 send commands and modules in the response. We believe that this time delay is used to make it difficult to receive and analyze new commands and modules in an isolated controlled environment.

‘COMMAND’ C2 response with empty command

If the C2 pushes some modules, the Base64-encoded binary is placed into field “20” of the message.

‘COMMAND’ C2 response with additional module to load

  • ‘STOLEN INFO’ message – bot message to C2 with stolen information like passwords, accounts, emails, etc. Stolen information is RC4 encrypted and Base64 encoded. The key for the RC4 encryption is generated in a different way and based on the infected system ID (aka Bot ID) values, and not based on a static string as in the case of traffic encryption.

‘STOLEN INFO’ message

Once communication with the C2 server has been established, QakBot is known to download and use additional modules in order to perform its malicious operations.

The additional modules differ from sample to sample and may include: ‘Cookie grabber’, ‘Email Collector’, ‘Credentials grabber’, and ‘Proxy module’ among others.

These modules may be written by the threat actors themselves or may be borrowed from third-party repositories and adapted. It can vary from sample to sample. For example, there are older samples that may use Mimikatz for credentials dumping.

Below are some of the modules that we found during our research.

Additional modules
  • Cookie Grabber – collects cookies from popular browsers (Edge, Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer).

  • Hidden VNC – allows threat actors to connect to the infected machine and interact with it without the real user knowing.

  • Email Collector – tries to find Microsoft Outlook on the infected machine, then iterates over the software folders and recursively collects emails. Finally, the module exfiltrates the collected emails to the remote server.

The threat actors distributed a debug version of the email collector module at some point

  • Hooking module – hooks a hardcoded set of WinAPI and (if they exist) Mozilla DLL Hooking is used to perform web injects, sniff traffic and keyboard data and even prevent DNS resolution of certain domains. Hooking works in the following way: QakBot injects a hooking module into the appropriate process, the module finds functions from the hardcoded set and modifies the functions so they jump to custom code.

The module contains a ciphered list of DLLs and functions that the bot will hook

  • Passgrabber module – collects logins and passwords from various sources: Firefox and Chrome files, Microsoft Vault storage, etc. Instead of using Mimikatz as in previous versions, the module collects passwords using its own algorithms.

Procedure that collects passwords from different sources

  • Proxy module – tries to determine which ports are available to listen to using the UPnP port forwarding and tier 2 С2 query. Comparing current and old proxy loader versions revealed some interesting things: the threat actors decided to remove the cURL dependency from the binary and perform all HTTP communications using their own code. Besides removing cURL, they also removed OpenSSL dependencies and embedded all functions into a single executable – there are no more proxy loaders or proxy modules, it’s a single file now.

UPnP port forwarding query construction

After trying to determine whether ports are open and the machine could act as a C2 tier 2 proxy, the proxy module also starts a multithreaded SOCKS5 proxy server. The SOCKS5 protocol is encapsulated into the QakBot proxy protocol composed of: QakBot proxy command (1 byte), version (1 byte), session id (4 bytes), total packet length (dword), data (total packet length-10). Incoming and outgoing packets are stored in the buffers and may be received/transmitted one by one or in multiple packets in a single TCP data segment (streamed).

The usual proxy module execution flow is as follows:

  1. Communicate with the C2, try to forward ports with UPnP and determine available ports and report them to the C2. The usual C2 communication protocol used here is HTTP POST RC4-ciphered JSON data.
  2. Download the OpenSSL library. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file.
  3. Set up external PROXY-C2 connection that was received with command 37 (update config)/module 274 (proxy) by the stager.

Communicating with the external PROXY-C2:

  1. Send initial proxy module request. The initial request contains the bot ID, external IP address of the infected machine, reverse DNS lookup of the external IP address, internet speed (measured earlier) and seconds since the proxy module started.
  2. Establish a connection (proxy commands sequence 1->10->11) with the PROXY-C2.
  3. Initialize sessions, perform socks5 authorization with login/password (received from PROXY-C2 with command 10).
  4. Begin SOCKS5-like communication wrapped into the QakBot proxy module protocol.

QakBot proxy commands are as follows:

Command Description 1 Hello (bot->C2) 10 Set up auth credentials (C2->bot) 11 Confirm credentials setup (bot->C2) 2 Create new proxy session (C2->bot) 3 SOCKS5 AUTH (bot->C2) 4 SOCKS5 requests processing (works for both sides) 5 Close session (works for both sides) 6 Update session state/session state updated notification (works for both sides) 7 Update session state/session state updated notification (works for both sides) 8 PING (C2->bot) 9 PONG (bot->C2) 19 Save current time in registry (C2->bot)

Parsed packets from C2

Tracking single proxy

  • Web inject – the configuration file for the hooking module
    Once communication with the C2 is established, one of the additional modules that is downloaded is the web-inject module. It intercepts the victim’s traffic by injecting the module into the browser’s process and hooking the network API. The hooking module gets the execution flow from intercepted APIs, and as soon as the victim accesses certain web pages related to banking and finance, additional JavaScript is injected into the source page.

Fragment of JavaScript injected into the source page of the Wells Fargo login page

QakBot statistics

We analyzed statistics on QakBot attacks collected from our Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), where anonymized data voluntarily provided by Kaspersky users is accumulated and processed. In the first seven months of 2021 our products detected 181,869 attempts to download or run QakBot. This number is lower than the detection number from January to July 2020, though the number of users affected grew by 65% compared to the previous year and reached 17,316.

Number of users affected by QakBot attacks from January to July in 2020 and 2021 (download)

We observed the largest campaigns in Q1 2021 when 12,704 users encountered QakBot, with 8,068 Kaspersky users being targeted in January and 4,007 in February.

Conclusions

QakBot is a known Trojan-Banker whose techniques may vary from binary to binary (older and newer versions). It has been active for over a decade and doesn’t look like going away anytime soon. The malware is continuously receiving updates and the threat actors keep adding new capabilities and updating its modules in order to steal information and maximize revenue.

We know that threat actors change how they perform their malicious activities based on security vendor activities, using sophisticated techniques to stay under the radar. Although QakBot uses different techniques to avoid detection, for example, process enumeration in order to find running anti-malware solutions, our products are able to detect the threat using behavior analysis. The verdicts usually assigned to this malware:

Backdoor.Win32.QBot
Backdoor.Win64.QBot
Trojan.JS.QBot
Trojan.MSOffice.QBot
Trojan.MSOffice.QbotLoader
Trojan.Win32.QBot
Trojan-Banker.Win32.QBot
Trojan-Banker.Win32.QakBot
Trojan-Banker.Win64.QBot
Trojan-Downloader.JS.QBot
Trojan-PSW.Win32.QBot
Trojan-Proxy.Win32.QBot

Indicators of compromise (C2 server addresses) 75.67.192[.]125:443 24.179.77[.]236:443 70.163.161[.]79:443 72.240.200[.]181:2222 184.185.103[.]157:443 78.63.226[.]32:443 83.196.56[.]65:2222 95.77.223[.]148:443 76.168.147[.]166:993 105.198.236[.]99:443 73.151.236[.]31:443 64.121.114[.]87:443 213.122.113[.]120:443 97.69.160[.]4:2222 77.27.207[.]217:995 105.198.236[.]101:443 75.188.35[.]168:443 31.4.242[.]233:995 144.139.47[.]206:443 173.21.10[.]71:2222 125.62.192[.]220:443 83.110.109[.]155:2222 76.25.142[.]196:443 195.12.154[.]8:443 186.144.33[.]73:443 67.165.206[.]193:993 96.21.251[.]127:2222 149.28.98[.]196:2222 222.153.122[.]173:995 71.199.192[.]62:443 45.77.117[.]108:2222 45.46.53[.]140:2222 70.168.130[.]172:995 45.32.211[.]207:995 71.74.12[.]34:443 82.12.157[.]95:995 149.28.98[.]196:995 50.29.166[.]232:995 209.210.187[.]52:995 149.28.99[.]97:443 109.12.111[.]14:443 209.210.187[.]52:443 207.246.77[.]75:8443 68.186.192[.]69:443 67.6.12[.]4:443 149.28.99[.]97:2222 188.27.179[.]172:443 189.222.59[.]177:443 149.28.101[.]90:443 98.192.185[.]86:443 174.104.22[.]30:443 149.28.99[.]97:995 189.210.115[.]207:443 142.117.191[.]18:2222 149.28.101[.]90:8443 68.204.7[.]158:443 189.146.183[.]105:443 92.59.35[.]196:2222 75.137.47[.]174:443 213.60.147[.]140:443 45.63.107[.]192:995 24.229.150[.]54:995 196.221.207[.]137:995 45.63.107[.]192:443 86.220.60[.]247:2222 108.46.145[.]30:443 45.32.211[.]207:8443 193.248.221[.]184:2222 187.250.238[.]164:995 197.45.110[.]165:995 151.205.102[.]42:443 2.7.116[.]188:2222 45.32.211[.]207:2222 71.41.184[.]10:3389 195.43.173[.]70:443 96.253.46[.]210:443 24.55.112[.]61:443 106.250.150[.]98:443 172.78.59[.]180:443 24.139.72[.]117:443 45.67.231[.]247:443 90.65.234[.]26:2222 72.252.201[.]69:443 83.110.103[.]152:443 47.22.148[.]6:443 175.143.92[.]16:443 83.110.9[.]71:2222 149.28.101[.]90:995 100.2.20[.]137:443 78.97.207[.]104:443 207.246.77[.]75:2222 46.149.81[.]250:443 59.90.246[.]200:443 144.202.38[.]185:995 207.246.116[.]237:8443 80.227.5[.]69:443 45.77.115[.]208:995 207.246.116[.]237:995 125.63.101[.]62:443 149.28.101[.]90:2222 207.246.116[.]237:443 86.236.77[.]68:2222 45.32.211[.]207:443 207.246.116[.]237:2222 109.106.69[.]138:2222 149.28.98[.]196:443 45.63.107[.]192:2222 84.72.35[.]226:443 45.77.117[.]108:443 71.163.222[.]223:443 217.133.54[.]140:32100 144.202.38[.]185:2222 98.252.118[.]134:443 197.161.154[.]132:443 45.77.115[.]208:8443 96.37.113[.]36:993 89.137.211[.]239:995 45.77.115[.]208:443 27.223.92[.]142:995 74.222.204[.]82:995 207.246.77[.]75:995 24.152.219[.]253:995 122.148.156[.]131:995 45.77.117[.]108:8443 24.95.61[.]62:443 156.223.110[.]23:443 45.77.117[.]108:995 96.61.23[.]88:995 144.139.166[.]18:443 45.77.115[.]208:2222 92.96.3[.]180:2078 202.185.166[.]181:443 144.202.38[.]185:443 71.187.170[.]235:443 76.94.200[.]148:995 207.246.77[.]75:443 50.244.112[.]106:443 71.63.120[.]101:443 140.82.49[.]12:443 24.122.166[.]173:443 196.151.252[.]84:443 81.214.126[.]173:2222 73.25.124[.]140:2222 202.188.138[.]162:443 216.201.162[.]158:443 47.196.213[.]73:443 74.68.144[.]202:443 136.232.34[.]70:443 186.154.175[.]13:443 69.58.147[.]82:2078

* Can be performed as an external command (extended module).

Is Traffic Mirroring for NDR Worth the Trouble? We Argue It Isn't

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 11:20
Network Detection & Response (NDR) is an emerging technology developed to close the blind security spots left by conventional security solutions, which hackers exploited to gain a foothold in target networks. Nowadays, enterprises are using a plethora of security solutions to protect their network from cyber threats. The most prominent ones are Firewalls, IPS/IDS, SIEM, EDR, and XDR (which
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

FTC Bans Stalkerware App SpyFone; Orders Company to Erase Secretly Stolen Data

The Hacker News - 2 Září, 2021 - 08:25
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission on Wednesday banned a stalkerware app company called SpyFone from the surveillance business over concerns that it stealthily harvested and shared data on people's physical movements, phone use, and online activities that were then used by stalkers and domestic abusers to monitor potential targets. "SpyFone is a brazen brand name for a surveillance business that
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

Gutenberg Template Library & Redux Framework Bugs Plague WordPress Sites

Threatpost - 1 Září, 2021 - 19:58
Two vulnerabilities in the site-building plugin could be useful tools in the hands of a skilled attacker, researchers warned.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security

LockBit Jumps Its Own Countdown, Publishes Bangkok Air Files

Threatpost - 1 Září, 2021 - 17:55
The ransomware gang claims to have pulled off successful attacks against two airlines and one airport with help from its Accenture attack.
Kategorie: Hacking & Security
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